2017
Sep
15
comment How confident can we be that nobody will crack a 128-bit key?
A specific 128-bit key or any 128-bit key? For the first I would say that you can be confident enough, for the second not so much. blog.cr.yp.to/20151120-batchattacks.html
Sep
15
comment Merkle trees instead of the Sponge or the Merkle-Damgård constructions for the design of cryptorgraphic hash functions
"a Merkle tree comes with computation overheads" Could you elaborate on that please? A Merkle tree would require the same amount of evaluations of the compression function as Merkle-Damgård. Where does the computation overhead come from? "and the memory usage are higher" Could you also elaborate on that? To my knowledcge the memory usage of a binary Merkle tree would be the same as the modern Merkle-Damgård variants. In any case, my question still remains: why K12 or Parallelhash don't use that Merkle-like construction directly instead of using it on top of the Sponge construction?
Sep
1
awarded Supporter
Aug
29
awarded Enthusiast
Aug
21
revised Merkle trees instead of the Sponge or the Merkle-Damgård constructions for the design of cryptorgraphic hash functions
Improved grammar
Aug
21
comment Merkle trees instead of the Sponge or the Merkle-Damgård constructions for the design of cryptorgraphic hash functions
@EllaRose A Merkle tree requires (about - depending on the actual construction used) the same amount of evaluations of the compression function when compared to Merkle-Damgård along with the advantage that it can optionally be parallelised. Considering that I would be interested to see how a Merkle tree could perform worse for (multiple?) short messages when compared to Merkle-Damgård.
Aug
21
comment Merkle trees instead of the Sponge or the Merkle-Damgård constructions for the design of cryptorgraphic hash functions
@Biv KangarooTwelve uses Sakura on top of the sponge construction in a way similar to ParallelHash.
Aug
20
awarded Student
Aug
20
asked Merkle trees instead of the Sponge or the Merkle-Damgård constructions for the design of cryptorgraphic hash functions
Aug
10
revised argon2 vs scrypt
spelling and spaces
Aug
9
comment Are tags longer than 128 bit possible for AES-256-CCM and AES-256-GCM?
Collisions are not an issue for MAC algorithms, and proper mac algorithms when used in an EtM construction with different nonces/IVs can't be used for data deduplication.
Jul
31
awarded Commentator
Jul
31
comment I am not convinced that SHA2/3 or AES256 is secure
"Someone has to develop an algorithm like AES. Which means, the source code is not private and can easily be broken" - Every algorithm is developed by someone. Whether the source code of an implementation is public or not is not relevant nor it can be deduced from the premise given.
Jul
20
comment Viability of using One-Time-Pad + HMAC in low-volume IoT communications
@MarkusJuenemann What makes you think that stream ciphers can not encrypt data whose bit size is not in multiples of 8?
Jul
18
comment How to truncate MAC to 32 bit?
@CodesInChaos KMAC is a specific algorithm standarised on doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185 on top of the Keccak construction.
Jul
14
comment Is quantum cryptography unbreakable?
This kind of "quantum cryptography" is probably a scam blog.cr.yp.to/20160516-quantum.html
Jul
10
revised does SHA* collide more or less than a random function?
fixed spelling
Jul
10
comment does SHA* collide more or less than a random function?
Somewhat relevant crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/48946
Jul
8
comment Creating certificate: Where is my private key stored?
@Eric-M If the CA generated your key-pair then you should probably change CA. No self-respecting CA will ever generate your keys. Nobody other than you should ever see your private key.
Jul
6
comment What exactly does s2k do in gpg
Related security.stackexchange.com/questions/15632/…
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